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COUNTERINSURGENCY FM 3-24
MCWP 3-33.5
http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-24.pdf
December 2006
Distribution Restriction: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
-Headquarters Department of the ARMY
EXCERPTS FROM THE INTRODUCTION:
"This is a game of wits and will. You've got to be learning and adapting constantly to survive." --General Peter J. Schoomaker, USA, 2004
"The United States possesses overwhelming conventional military superiority. This capability has pushed its enemies to fight the U.S. forces unconventionally, mixing modern technology with ancient techniques of insurgency and terrorism. Most enemies either do not try to defeat the United States with conventional operations or do not limit themselves to purely military means. They know that they cannot compete with U.S. forces on those terms. Instead, they try to exhaust U.S. national will, aiming to win by undermining and outlasting public support. Defeating such enemies presents a huge challenge to the Army and Marine Corps. Meeting it requires creative efforts by every Soldier and Marine.
"Throughout its history, the U.S. military has had to relearn the principles of counterinsurgency (COIN) while conducting operations against adaptive insurgent enemies. IT is time to institutionalize Army and Marine Corps knowledge of this longstanding form of conflict. This publication's purpose is to help prepare Army and Marine Corps leaders to conduct COIN operations anywhere in the world. It provides a foundation for study before deployment and the basis for operations in theater. Perhaps more importantly, it provides techniques for generating and incorporating lessons learned during those operations -- an essential requirement for success against today's adaptive foes. Using these techniques and processes can keep U.S. forces more agile and adaptive than their irregular enemies. Knowledge of the history and principles of insurgency and COIN provides a solid foundation that informed leaders can use to assess insurgencies. This knowledge can also help them make appropriate decisions on employing all instruments of national power against these threats.
"All insurgencies are different; however, broad historical trends underlie the factors motivating insurgents. Most insurgencies follow a similar course of development. The tactics used to successfully defeat them are likewise similar in most cases. Similarly, history shows that some tactics that are usually successful against conventional foes may fail against insurgents.
"One common feature of insurgencies is that the government that is being targeted generally takes awhile to recognize that an insurgency is occurring. Insurgents take advantage of that time to build strength and gather support. Thus, counter insurgents often have to "come from behind" when fighting an insurgency. Another common feature is that forces conducting COIN operations usually begin poorly. Western militaries too often neglect the study of insurgency. They falsely believe that armies trained to win large conventional wars are automatically prepared to win small, unconventional ones. IN fact, some capabilities required for conventional success -- for example, the ability to execute operational maneuver and employ massive firepower -- may be of limited utility or even counterproductive in COIN operations. Nonetheless, convention forces beginning COIN operations often try to use these capabilities to defeat insurgents; they almost always fail.
"The military forces that successfully defeat insurgencies are usually those able to overcome their institutional inclination to wage conventional war against insurgents. They learn how to practice COIN and apply that knowledge. This publication can help to compress the learning curve. It is a tool for planners, trainers, and field commanders. Using it can help leaders begin the learning process sooner and build it on a larger knowledge base. Learning done before deployment results in fewer lives lost and less national treasure spent relearning past lessons in combat.
"In COIN, the side that learns faster and adapts more rapidly -- the better learning organization -- usually wins. Counterinsurgencies have been called learning competitions. Thus, this publications identifies "Learn and Adapt" as a modern COIN imperative for U.S. forces. However, Soldiers and Marines cannot wait until they are alerted to deploy to prepare for a COIN mission. Learning to conduct complex COIN operations begins with study beforehand. This publication is a good place to start. The annotated bibliography lists a number of other sources; however, these are only a sample of the vast amount of available information on this subject. Adapting occurs as Soldiers and Marines apply what they have learned through study and experience, assess the results of their actions, and continue to learn during operations.
"As learning organizations, the Army and Marine Corps encourage Soldiers and Marines to pay attention to the rapidly changing situation that characterize COIN operations. Current tactics, techniques, and procedures sometimes do not achieve the desired results. When that happens, successful leaders engage in a directed search for better ways to defeat the enemy. To win, the Army and Marine Corps must rapidly develop an institutional consensus on new doctrine, publish it, and carefully observe its impact on mission accomplishment. This learning cycle should repeat continuously as U.S. counter insurgents seek to learn faster than the insurgent enemy. The side that learns faster and adapts more rapidly wins.
"Just as there are historical principles underlying success in COIN, there are organizational traits shared by most successful learning organizations. Forces that learn COIN effectively have generally --
* Developed COIN doctrine and practices locally.
* Established local training centers during COIN operations.
* Regularly challenged their assumptions, both formally and informally.
* Learned about the broader world outside the military and requested outside assistance in understanding foreign political, cultural, social, and other situations beyond their experience.
* Promoted suggestions from the field.
* Fostered open communication between senior officers and their subordinates.
* Established rapid avenues of disseminating lessons learned.
* Coordinated closely with governmental and nongovernmental partners at all command levels.
* Proved open to soliciting and evaluating advice from the local people in the conflict zone.
"These are not always easy practices for an organization to establish. Adopting them is particularly challenging for a military engaged in a conflict. However, these traits are essential for any military confronting an enemy who does not fight using conventional tactics and who adapts while waging irregular warfare. Learning organizations defeat insurgencies; bureaucratic hierarchies do not. . .
"COIN campaigns are often long and difficult. Progress can be hard to measure, and the enemy may appear to have many advantages. Effective insurgents rapidly adapt to changing circumstances. They cleverly use the tools of the global information revolution to magnify the effects of their actions. They often carry out barbaric acts and do not observe accepted norms of behavior. However, by focusing on efforts to secure the safety and support of the local populace, and through a concerted effort to truly function as learning organizations, the Army and Marine Corps can defeat their insurgent enemies."
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