COUNTERINSURGENCY - U.S. ARMY Releases Updated COIN Manual
Road to the IZ - International Zone, Baghdad
"Compare the Iran/Iraq conflict, an symmetrical warfare example, to the U.S. led conflict in Iraq today, an example of symmetrical warefare.
Iran/Iraq is a very good example of classic, symmetrical warfare. Some of the soldiers I had with me on my last tour were in the 8 year protracted conflict between those two neighbors. It was, in its most simple form, a war of attrition where one side simply tries to wear down the other. No strategic weapons or victories...no high-tech, whiz-bang toys to bring the other to its knees.Just simple, day-to-day killing.
The road under the big crossed swords down by the IZ (sorry...international zone) in Baghdad is paved with helmets taken from Iranian soldiers and placed there by Saddam as a reminder...and so he could drive over them
every day on his way into work. Some say there are still heads in some of the helmets. I don't plan to check. . .
The vehicle in the right foreground of the picture is the Buffalo...an EOD vehicle that is used for route clearance. It is remarkably like the Bonecrusher Decepticon from 'Transformers', although the vehicle has been around at least since 2005. The Humvee in the left background is one of the PSD vehicles that escort us when we ride the Buffalo over to the IZ. Nobody goes outside the wire without security. Most folks ride the Rhino Runner armoured bus, but since the bomb folks use our equipment and REALLY like to be sure it works well, they are eager to help us when we have to do our assessments.
I have attached a recent picture of me sitting on Saddam's old throne in Al Faw Palace. (He isn't using it anymore.) So you can see I AM old."
- Bob
Photo and quote by MSG Robert Anderson
Joint CREW Composite Squadron One
Camp Victory
Baghdad, Iraq
Old Soldiers never die, preferring instead to sit on Saddam's throne.
Iraqi children wave and give flowers to U.S. soldiers at al-Kazimiya district in Baghdad.
Email from Bob Anderson, serving in Iraq, 12/28/07:
If you get REALLY bored ... . . . or snowed in, you might want to download and read the new COIN manual. It is greatly updated and improved based upon a couple of years of real-world experience.
December 2006 Distribution Restriction: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. -Headquarters Department of the ARMY
Excerpts from the FORWARD:
"This manual is designed to fill a doctrinal gap. It has been 20 years since the Army published a field manual devoted exclusively to counterinsurgency operations. For the Marine Corps it has been 25 years. With our Soldiers and Marines fighting insurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq, it is essential that we give them a manual that provides principles and guidelines for counterinsurgency operations. Such guidance must be grounded in historical studies. However, it also must be informed by contemporary experiences.
"This manual takes a general approach to counterinsurgency operations. The Army and Marine Corps recognize that every insurgency is contextual and presents its own set of challenges. You cannot fight former Saddamists and Islamic extremists the same way you would have fought the Viet Cong, Moros, or Tupamaros; the application of principles and fundamentals to deal with each varies considerably. Nonetheless, all insurgencies, even today's highly adaptable strains, remain wars amongst the people. They use variations of standard themes and adhere to elements of a recognizable revolutionary campaign plan. This manual therefore addresses the common characteristics of insurgencies. It strives to provide those conducting counterinsurgency campaigns with a solid foundation for understanding and addressing specific insurgencies...
"Conducting a successful counterinsurgency campaign requires a flexible, adaptive force led by agile, well-informed, culturally astute leaders. It is our hope that this manual provided the guidelines needed to succeed in operations that are exceedingly difficult and complex. Our Soldiers and Marines deserve nothing less."
SIGNED:
DAVID H. PETRAEUS Lieutenant Genearl, U.S. Army Commandaer U.S. Army Combined Arms Center
and
JAMES F. AMOS Lieutenant General, U.S. Marine Corps Deputy Commandant Combat Development and Integration
Receiving rations in Iraq
Woman carrying rations
The following op-ed piece was written by a guy at West Point who spent a bit of time over here. He has discussed a problem that is all too familiar from another conflict a number of years ago.
The article was on military.com. If you do not subscribe, you might find it of interest.
What do you think of when you hear the word "terp"? If you're a Marylander, you're likely to give a yell of support for your local sports team. If you're a pilot, you probably break open your publications bag and dig for the latest set of Terminal Instrument Procedures. But if you've served any time on the ground in Iraq, you probably have very vivid and fond memories of your "terp" -- that is, your interpreter, the Iraqi who, in a very real sense, was your eyes and ears when you went outside the wire.
The best estimate right now is that anywhere from 30,000 to 100,000 Iraqis have worked directly for our forces in Iraq since 2003. These men and women put their lives on the line every day to help U.S. and coalition forces build a safer Iraq. Often with minimal protection and support, many of them are forced to hide their identities from friends and neighbors lest they expose themselves to retribution from sectarian enemies. Consider this anecdote from an outstanding piece written last year by George Packer:
Ahmed took two taxis to the Green Zone, then walked the last few hundred yards, or drove a different route every day. He carried a decoy phone and hid his Embassy phone in his car. He had always loved the idea of wearing a jacket and tie in an official job, but he had to keep them in his office at the Embassy -- it was impossible to drive to work dressed like that. Ahmed and the other Iraqis entered code names for friends and colleagues into their phones, in case they were kidnapped. Whenever they got a call in public from an American contact, they answered in Arabic and immediately hung up. They communicated mostly by text message. They never spoke English in front of their children. One Iraqi employee slept in his car in the Green Zone parking lot for several nights, because it was too dangerous to go home.
Or consider this more recent piece:
For Hamed, a forklift driver at an American military base, life has become a series of disguises. He has been a cabdriver, a man who does not understand English, and most recently, a laundry worker. None of those identities were true, but all were necessary to hide his ties to the United States. So when someone he knew handed him a bag of dirty clothes last month, Hamed, a mild-mannered 33-year-old father of two, had no choice but to wash them. "I said, ‘It’s my job,’ and I took them," he said. He spoke on condition that his last name not be used out of fear for his and his family’s safety.
So how are we repaying these people? The State Department promised to bring in 12,000 of our Iraqi colleagues to safety in Fiscal Year 2008 (October 2007 to October 2008). Not an easy task, but certainly not impossible. And yet, here we are, 1/4 of the way through the year, and not only have we brought in barely 1000 of that 12,000, the numbers admitted have actually dropped from month to month. It's not that we can't identify people -- thelistproject.org, an effort led by a former USAID worker, has over 1000 Iraqis identified right now with letters of recommendation from American servicemembers, validated contact information, and legal representation waiting to help them. It's that, absent any kind of imperative from the U.S. government to help these people, the bureaucracy drags its heels and our friends r emain out there, twisting in the wind.
What about security? What about the possibility that a terrorist could get into the U.S. under the guide of one of these refugees? This isn't our first time handling something like this, folks. In 1999, we processed nearly 20,000 Kosovo refugees through Fort Dix, NJ as they fled the fighting in their country. In 1996, in OPERATION PACIFIC HAVEN, we took in 6600 Kurdish refugees who had been displaced after revolts against Saddam's rule. In the latter case, it took us approximately 90-120 days to conduct a security screening for each family involved, all while they were kept in a secure facility on Guam. If the political will is there, it can be done, and done well.
Make no mistake about it -- these people are our brothers and sisters in arms. If you have any doubts about that, I encourage you to read the stories from people like Paul Rieckhoff , Mike Zacchea, or Zach Iscol. We would never dream of leaving a fellow soldier in the state we've left these people in. But in a larger sense, these people are also a symbol of American resolve. They are a tangible, visible sign of how the United States treats (or fails to treat) those who help us. If these men and women are left hanging, others who might be inclined to help us will take note and remember well how we treat those who put their lives on the line for us.
December 2006 Distribution Restriction: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. -Headquarters Department of the ARMY
EXCERPTS FROM THE INTRODUCTION:
"This is a game of wits and will. You've got to be learning and adapting constantly to survive." --General Peter J. Schoomaker, USA, 2004
"The United States possesses overwhelming conventional military superiority. This capability has pushed its enemies to fight the U.S. forces unconventionally, mixing modern technology with ancient techniques of insurgency and terrorism. Most enemies either do not try to defeat the United States with conventional operations or do not limit themselves to purely military means. They know that they cannot compete with U.S. forces on those terms. Instead, they try to exhaust U.S. national will, aiming to win by undermining and outlasting public support. Defeating such enemies presents a huge challenge to the Army and Marine Corps. Meeting it requires creative efforts by every Soldier and Marine.
"Throughout its history, the U.S. military has had to relearn the principles of counterinsurgency (COIN) while conducting operations against adaptive insurgent enemies. IT is time to institutionalize Army and Marine Corps knowledge of this longstanding form of conflict. This publication's purpose is to help prepare Army and Marine Corps leaders to conduct COIN operations anywhere in the world. It provides a foundation for study before deployment and the basis for operations in theater. Perhaps more importantly, it provides techniques for generating and incorporating lessons learned during those operations -- an essential requirement for success against today's adaptive foes. Using these techniques and processes can keep U.S. forces more agile and adaptive than their irregular enemies. Knowledge of the history and principles of insurgency and COIN provides a solid foundation that informed leaders can use to assess insurgencies. This knowledge can also help them make appropriate decisions on employing all instruments of national power against these threats.
"All insurgencies are different; however, broad historical trends underlie the factors motivating insurgents. Most insurgencies follow a similar course of development. The tactics used to successfully defeat them are likewise similar in most cases. Similarly, history shows that some tactics that are usually successful against conventional foes may fail against insurgents.
"One common feature of insurgencies is that the government that is being targeted generally takes awhile to recognize that an insurgency is occurring. Insurgents take advantage of that time to build strength and gather support. Thus, counter insurgents often have to "come from behind" when fighting an insurgency. Another common feature is that forces conducting COIN operations usually begin poorly. Western militaries too often neglect the study of insurgency. They falsely believe that armies trained to win large conventional wars are automatically prepared to win small, unconventional ones. IN fact, some capabilities required for conventional success -- for example, the ability to execute operational maneuver and employ massive firepower -- may be of limited utility or even counterproductive in COIN operations. Nonetheless, convention forces beginning COIN operations often try to use these capabilities to defeat insurgents; they almost always fail.
"The military forces that successfully defeat insurgencies are usually those able to overcome their institutional inclination to wage conventional war against insurgents. They learn how to practice COIN and apply that knowledge. This publication can help to compress the learning curve. It is a tool for planners, trainers, and field commanders. Using it can help leaders begin the learning process sooner and build it on a larger knowledge base. Learning done before deployment results in fewer lives lost and less national treasure spent relearning past lessons in combat.
"In COIN, the side that learns faster and adapts more rapidly -- the better learning organization -- usually wins. Counterinsurgencies have been called learning competitions. Thus, this publications identifies "Learn and Adapt" as a modern COIN imperative for U.S. forces. However, Soldiers and Marines cannot wait until they are alerted to deploy to prepare for a COIN mission. Learning to conduct complex COIN operations begins with study beforehand. This publication is a good place to start. The annotated bibliography lists a number of other sources; however, these are only a sample of the vast amount of available information on this subject. Adapting occurs as Soldiers and Marines apply what they have learned through study and experience, assess the results of their actions, and continue to learn during operations.
"As learning organizations, the Army and Marine Corps encourage Soldiers and Marines to pay attention to the rapidly changing situation that characterize COIN operations. Current tactics, techniques, and procedures sometimes do not achieve the desired results. When that happens, successful leaders engage in a directed search for better ways to defeat the enemy. To win, the Army and Marine Corps must rapidly develop an institutional consensus on new doctrine, publish it, and carefully observe its impact on mission accomplishment. This learning cycle should repeat continuously as U.S. counter insurgents seek to learn faster than the insurgent enemy. The side that learns faster and adapts more rapidly wins.
"Just as there are historical principles underlying success in COIN, there are organizational traits shared by most successful learning organizations. Forces that learn COIN effectively have generally --
* Developed COIN doctrine and practices locally. * Established local training centers during COIN operations. * Regularly challenged their assumptions, both formally and informally. * Learned about the broader world outside the military and requested outside assistance in understanding foreign political, cultural, social, and other situations beyond their experience. * Promoted suggestions from the field. * Fostered open communication between senior officers and their subordinates. * Established rapid avenues of disseminating lessons learned. * Coordinated closely with governmental and nongovernmental partners at all command levels. * Proved open to soliciting and evaluating advice from the local people in the conflict zone.
"These are not always easy practices for an organization to establish. Adopting them is particularly challenging for a military engaged in a conflict. However, these traits are essential for any military confronting an enemy who does not fight using conventional tactics and who adapts while waging irregular warfare. Learning organizations defeat insurgencies; bureaucratic hierarchies do not. . .
"COIN campaigns are often long and difficult. Progress can be hard to measure, and the enemy may appear to have many advantages. Effective insurgents rapidly adapt to changing circumstances. They cleverly use the tools of the global information revolution to magnify the effects of their actions. They often carry out barbaric acts and do not observe accepted norms of behavior. However, by focusing on efforts to secure the safety and support of the local populace, and through a concerted effort to truly function as learning organizations, the Army and Marine Corps can defeat their insurgent enemies."
“History does not entrust the care of freedom to the weak or timid.”~Dwight D. Eisenhower Copyright 2007-2008TALK CITIZEN ™ is a trademark of LobaTek Incorporated
